منوی کاربری
  • پشتیبانی: ۴۲۲۷۳۷۸۱ - ۰۴۱
  • سبد خرید

دانلود رایگان مقاله مزایده دوبل برای بازارهای ازدحام همراه حسگر دو طرفه ناهمگن

عنوان فارسی
مزایده دوبل صادق برای بازارهای ازدحام همراه حسگر دو طرفه ناهمگن
عنوان انگلیسی
A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
12
سال انتشار
2015
نشریه
الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
کد محصول
E689
رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله
مهندسی کامپیوتر، مهندسی فناوری اطلاعات و مهندسی فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله
مخابرات سیار
مجله
ارتباطات کامپیوتر - Computer Communications
دانشگاه
موسسه فناوری رایانه، آکادمی علوم چین، چین
کلمات کلیدی
حسگر جمعیت همراه، دو حراج، مکانیسم راستگویی، بازار ناهمگن
۰.۰ (بدون امتیاز)
امتیاز دهید
چکیده

abstract


Incentive mechanisms are critical for the success of mobile crowdsensing (MCS). Existing mechanisms mainly focus on scenarios where all sensing tasks are belong to a monopolistic campaign, while ignoring the situation where multiple campaigns coexist and compete for potential sensing capacities. In this paper, we study mechanisms in a two-sided heterogeneous MCS market with multiple requesters and users, where each requester publishes a sensing campaign consisting of various tasks whereas each user can undertake multiple tasks from one or more campaigns. The mechanism design in such a market is very challenging as the demands and supplies are extremely diverse. To fairly and effectively allocate resources and facilitate trades, we propose a novel truthful double auction mechanism named TDMC. By introducing a carefully designed virtual padding requester, a two-stage allocation approach and corresponding pricing schemes for both requesters and users are developed in TDMC. Through theoretical analysis, we prove that TDMC has the properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, budget balance, computational tractability, and asymptotic efficiency as the workload supply compared with demand becomes more and more sufficient. To make TDMC more adaptable, we further introduce two more flexible bid profiles for both requesters and users, and two adjustment methods to control the sensing quality. Extensive simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of TDMC.

نتیجه گیری

7. Conclusion


In this paper, we propose a truthful double auction TDMC for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets. TDMC develops a two-stage allocation approach and corresponding pricing schemes for both requesters and users. We prove that TDMC is truthful, individual rational, budget balanced, computational tractable, and asymptotic efficient as the workload supply compared with demand becomes more and more sufficient. Several practical issues are also considered to make TDMC more adaptable. Extensive simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of TDMC.


بدون دیدگاه