دانلود رایگان مقاله آموزش آنلاین، سیگنالینگ، و سرمایه انسانی

Abstract

We show that the prediction of strategic connectivity breakdowns under a receiving-party-pays system and discrimination between on- and off-net prices does not hold up once more than two mobile networks are considered. Indeed, if there are at least three competing networks and enough utility is obtained from receiving calls, no strategic connectivity breakdowns occur. Private negotiations over access charges then achieve the efficient outcome. Bill & keep (zero access charges) and free outgoing and incoming calls are efficient if and only marginal costs of calls are zero.

4. Summary

Online higher education may lower the time cost of education for less able individuals relative to that for the more able, increasing welfare if education only adds to human capital.14 When education is a signal of inherent ability, possible over-investment in education by the more able may occur (Spence, 1974, 2002). When over-investment occurs, it is because it is necessary to prevent the less able from mimicking the educational choices of those who are more able. Less over-investment occurs the larger the difference in education cost between less able and more able individuals. More abstract education may result in an increase in the educational cost difference between less and more able individuals, reducing overinvestment in education by the more able, the opposite of what may result from increased online education. I considered the possibility that education adds to human capital and may be a signal of inherent ability. Then, assuming more able individuals over-invest in education in a signaling equilibrium, if these individuals are (1) a smaller fraction of the population, or if (2) the output per unit of education of the more able is lower, then a lower level of education cost for the less able is more likely to be consistent with maximization of total welfare. The loss in welfare for the more able from lowering education cost for the less able is due to increased over-investment in education by the more able. Fewer more able individuals, and a lower output per unit of education for the more able both imply a smaller decrease in welfare for them as they move further from their welfare-maximizing level of education.