دانلود رایگان مقاله غرامت اجرایی و عملکرد شرکت

عنوان فارسی
غرامت اجرایی و عملکرد شرکت: شواهد از شرکت های هندی
عنوان انگلیسی
Executive compensation and firm performance: Evidence from Indian firms
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
10
سال انتشار
2016
نشریه
الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
کد محصول
E3494
رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله
مدیریت
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله
مدیریت عملکرد
مجله
نقد و بررسی مدیریت - IIMB Management Review
دانشگاه
موسسه مدیریت هند
کلمات کلیدی
اجرایی، جبران خسارت، عملکرد شرکت، گروه کسب و کار
۰.۰ (بدون امتیاز)
امتیاز دهید
چکیده

Abstract


The study examines the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance among Indian firms. The evidence suggests that firm performance measured by accounting, as well as market-based measures, significantly affects executive compensation. We also test for the presence of persistence in executive compensation by employing the system-generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimator. We find significant persistence in executive compensation among the sample firms. Further, we report the absence of pay–performance relationship among the smaller sample firms and business group affiliated firms. Thus, our findings cast doubts over the performance-based executive compensation practices of Indian business group affiliated firms.

نتیجه گیری

Concluding remarks


In this study, we empirically examine the pay–performance relationship among Indian firms. The study reports signifi- cant persistence in executive compensation among the sample firms. The persistence in the executive compensation exists even among the sub-samples of firms, classified based on size and ownership. Findings also suggest the existence of significant pay–performance relationship among the sample firms. However, when performance is measured using market based measures, we do not find pay–performance relationship among the sample firms. It may be argued that sample firms determine their executive compensation based on the accounting based measures of firm performance rather than market based measures. Further, we report the absence of pay–performance relationship among the business group affiliated firms, whereas their stand-alone counterparts report significant pay– performance relationship. Such an observation casts doubts over the performance based executive compensation practices of Indian business group affiliated firms. We also find that the pay–performance relationship is absent among the small sample firms, but the relationship is significant among the larger sample firms. We attribute such a contrast in our observation to the underdeveloped nature of institutional mechanisms and weak investor activism in India.


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