دانلود رایگان مقاله کنترل سهامداران و زمان بندی بازار

Abstract

We find partial support for a permanent increase in firm value following U.S. cross-listings. Cross-listed firms with capital-raising intentions on U.S. exchanges and firms cross-listing after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act exhibit an increase in firm value. Yet, investors are worse off in the long run when owning insider-controlled cross-listings. Compared to non-insider-owned cross-listings, insider-owned firms have a greater rise in value around the cross-listing year but also a larger decline in the post-cross-listing years. In fact, insider-owned firms lose value by the fifth year, compared with their value before cross-listing. Lastly, we show that liquidity and visibility enhance the value of cross-listings.

5. Concluding remarks

Firms that cross-list in the U.S. have a considerable impact on the fi- nancial markets in both the home country and the U.S. After the enactment of the SOX in 2002, firms seem more likely to maintain a crosslisting premium. Capital-raising intentions and ownership structure are important to explain the valuation of cross-listings in the short and long term. Moreover, it appears that investors value more visibility in firms with insider ownership and firms allowed to raise capital on U.S. exchanges. It is important for managers and practitioners to know whether there is a long-lasting benefit from cross-listing on U.S. stock exchanges and whether it can be attained by focusing on measurable and identifiable characteristics such as corporate governance and investor recognition. We find partial support for a permanent increase in firm value following U.S. cross-listings. Cross-listed firms with capital-raising intentions on U.S. exchanges and firms cross-listing after the SarbanesOxley exhibit potential to earn a permanent cross-listing premium. However, investors are worse off in the long run when owning insider-owned cross-listings. Compared to non-insider-owned firms, insider-owned firms have a larger decline in value during the post-crosslisting years where the initial spike in firm value dwindles. In fact, insider-owned firms lose value by the fifth year when compared to their value before cross-listing. Overall, the behavior of insider-controlled firms relative to non-insider controlled firms raise questions about previous findings supporting the bonding hypothesis. The reaction of firms to the cross-listing event is stronger for firms with insider ownership and investors can take advantage of the early market valuation gains. However, in the long run, investors do not benefit by holding insidercontrolled cross-listings rather than a comparable non-insider-controlled cross-listing.