دانلود رایگان مقاله جنسیت مدیر عامل و کارایی شرکت

عنوان فارسی
جنسیت مدیر عامل و کارایی شرکت
عنوان انگلیسی
Ceo gender and firm performance
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
12
سال انتشار
2013
نشریه
الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
کد محصول
E2385
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مدیریت
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله
مدیریت کسب و کار و مدیریت عملکرد
مجله
مجله اقتصاد و کسب و کار - Journal of Economics and Business
دانشگاه
دانشگاه اونسویل، امریکا
کلمات کلیدی
جبران اجرایی، جنسیت، اجرا، خطر گریزی
۰.۰ (بدون امتیاز)
امتیاز دهید
چکیده

abstract


Based on a panel of US firms over the period of 1992 to 2004, we evaluated whether firms managed by female CEOs exhibit the same performance as firms managed by male CEOs. We also examined if the gender of the CEO affects the firm risk level, and if the compensation packages that boards give to female CEOs have less risky components than those given to male CEOs. Our results revealed new insights: on average, the gender of the CEO matters in terms of firm performance. When the CEO is a female, the firm risk level is smaller than when the CEO is a male. Another important finding is that boards are not attending to the risk aversion differences between male and female CEOs when they design the compensation packages, especially equity based compensation, which can be understood as an incentive to female CEOs to take risks.

نتیجه گیری

6. Summary and conclusions


Based on a panel of new and old economy US firms over the period of 1992 to 2004, we examine if the firms run by male CEOs exhibit the same performance as the firms run by female CEOs, if the firm risk level is different when a firm is managed by a female CEO, and if the compensation package that boards give to female CEOs has less (or more) risky components than what the boards give to male CEOs. Our results reveal new insights in the area: firms with female CEOs are associated with an increase in performance compared to the firms managed by male CEOs. We also find that when the CEO is a woman, the firm risk level is smaller than when the CEO is a man. Also, the boards do not appear to consider the risk aversion differences between male and female CEOs when they design the compensation packages since they award female CEOs practically the same proportions of risky compensation components (stock options) as they award to male CEOs. An alternative and plausible explanation is that the boards are awarding the same proportion of risky components to female CEOs as they award to male CEOs to induce female CEOs to take risks. Notes (1) Restricted stocks are stocks subject to restrictions on sale and risk of forfeiture until vested by continued employment. Restricted stock typically vests in increments over a period of several years. Dividends or dividend equivalent rights may be paid, and award holders may have voting rights during the restricted period. (2) A Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) is any plan that provides compensation that is intended to serve as an incentive for performance and that occurs over a period longer than one year but not including restricted stock, stock option or stock appreciation rights plans.


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