دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی مدل های زنجیره تامین با مسئولیت اجتماعی شرکت - تیلور و فرانسیس 2017

Currently, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a critical issue because more than 88% of consumers think companies should try to achieve their business goals while improving society and the environment. This paper focuses on a CSR supply chain where an Original Equipment Manufacturer’s (OEM’s) sales can be significantly reduced because of its oversea supplier’s social misconduct. Specifically, as in a conventional wholesale price contract the supplier determines its wholesale price and the OEM decides its order quantity, but in a CSR supply chain, the supplier can autonomously change its CSR cost once a minimum requirement is satisfied. A higher CSR cost means that the supplier invests more in its corporate social responsibility and the OEM’s sales will be less likely to be influenced by negative CSR events. The equilibrium solutions show an important dilemma – although the supplier’s profit increases in the basic CSR requirement, the supplier will always use the minimum CSR cost under the conventional wholesale price contract, which eventually leads to a low supply chain profit. Thus, we introduce two different contracts to handle this problem: the flexible quantity contract and the wholesale price incentive contract, which are, respectively, a ‘tough’ way and a ‘beneficent’ way for the OEM to solve the problem. Although the two ways cannot (always) coordinate the supply chain, we show that they both will significantly improve the supply chain performance. Our results also show that in some conditions, one strategy will dominate, whereas in different conditions the other strategy dominates.

7. Conclusions

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become an increasingly vital issue for multinational enterprises. In particular, within the supply chain, a firm’s sales and reputation can be deeply damaged by the misconduct of its suppliers.

In this paper, we investigate how a firm should use supply chain contracts to avoid or mitigate a supplier’s possible misconduct, focusing on a CSR supply chain consisting of an OEM and an overseas supplier, and introducing a decision model for the CSR supply chain. Our model incorporates these two facts: (i) the possibility of the market disruption can be reduced through a higher CSR investment, and (ii) the society has a minimum requirement for the supplier’s CSR. The supplier has to determine its wholesale price and CSR cost, while the OEM has to decide its order quantity and retail price.

A dilemma of the CSR supply chain appears from its equilibrium solutions – the supplier always utilises the minimum CSR cost, which eventually leads to a low supply chain efficiency. This paper considers two contracts, the flexible quantity contract and the wholesale price incentive contract, to solve this problem. Our results show that while both types of contract can improve the supply chain performance, neither contract always dominates the other. A contract dominating in some conditions will be dominated in other conditions. Besides the above dilemma, our results can also explain why, in most cases, the OEM prefers to select a supplier whose host country has a relatively low CSR requirement.