دانلود رایگان مقاله چرا محققان پاداش می گیرند؟ در زمینه فناوری و رقابت بازار

abstract

A temporary change in pay to employed inventors around the time of patent application has been documented. A theoretical model is here developed to provide an explanation to said findings based on the idea that inventors may be able to use the knowledge previously generated while working in a firm, in a rival company. The model features firms who hire workers in R&D functions to make product innovations. The innovation process consists of distinct phases each with different access to information about the innovation value for firms. Firms compete to attract workers, and workers can transfer part of the generated new knowledge to a new employer. Results suggest that the capital intensity of R&D investments, and the type and size of knowledge spillovers, may affect the probability to observe bonus pay at the time of a patent application. Different tax incentives and subsidies are then studied as a means to correct for possible underinvestment of capital. We study the effect of a patent box, a subsidy to R&D capital investments, and a subsidy to bonus pay. When market rivalry prevails over positive knowledge externalities, a bonus pay incentive was found to obtain the social first-best while a patent box or a subsidy to capital investment would cause overinvestment. When positive knowledge externalities prevail, either a patent box or a subsidy to capital investment obtain the social optimal level of capital investments

6. Conclusions

The model presented in this study combines employed inventors mobility under competition for talent with a multi-stage innovation process, capital investments in R&D and knowledge externalities. The model assumes full (potential) mobility of workers and provides general conditions under which we can expect pay to be increasing at the time of a patent application. It was shown that these conditions are function of the joint effect of knowledge spillovers caused by labor mobility and of absorptive capacity possessed by competing firms, and of capital intensity in R&D functions. The model provides some testable assertions: it should be more common to use bonus pay at the time of a patent application in industries or firms where the R&D process features lower capital intensity in R&D and when innovations are highly profitable. Larger spillovers, more absorptive capacity and low investment costs for imitation make it more likely to observe bonus pay. When market rivalry (and thus the harm caused to the original innovating firm due to an inventor switching employer) is larger than the benefit produced for the new employer, bonus pay becomes less likely as the gap between the harm and the benefit reduces. The latter situation may represent a market with weak protection for intellectual property.