دانلود رایگان مقاله رابطه بین عدم تقارن اطلاعات، سیاست تقسیم سود و ساختار مالکیت

Abstract

This study examines the relationship among information asymmetry, dividend policy and ownership structure for Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2012. We find that firms with higher information asymmetry are less likely to pay dividends. Further, the sample is divided into state-controlled and non-state-controlled firms, and the results show that state-controlled firms with higher information asymmetry would pay higher dividends compared to non-state-controlled firms. In addition, we find that the split share structure reform enhanced information transparency, leading to a positive moderating effect on the relation between information asymmetry and dividend policy.

5. Conclusions

Different interpretations of corporate dividend payouts have been proposed in the literature (Allen and Michaely, 2003). The dividend signaling hypothesis suggests that managers, in comparison to external investors, know more about the inside information related to future corporate growth. Hence, firms can convey the information to capital markets through dividend payouts. However, agency theory demonstrates that when the legal system is weak, dividends cannot be used as a tool to avoid agency problems. This study probes into the effect of information asymmetry on dividend payouts and explores the moderating effects of the ownership structure and China’s split share structure reform.