دانلود رایگان مقاله یکپارچگی لایه فیزیکی برای پیام های بی سیم

Abstract

In this work, we discuss physical layer message manipulation attacks, in which an attacker changes physical-layer properties of an original wireless message. Instead of targeting the data content of the message, those attacks target message properties such as time-of-arrival, signal strength, angle-of-arrival, and others. As such attacks do not change the data content, they do not violate the message’s data integrity. Instead, we introduce the notion of physical-layer message integrity (PMI), that describes the absence of manipulations for physical-layer message characteristics. Among the different physical-layer characteristics, we focus on delay attacks in which an attacker delays a message sent from victim A to a nearby victim B. Such attacks can be used on time-synchronization, distance measurement, and other time-sensitive measurements such as phasor measurements in power grids. In that context, we speak of message temporal integrity (MTI) as characteristic targeted by the attack. Informally, MTI is preserved if the message is neither advanced nor delayed in transmission. We discuss how to detect attacks on MTI, and propose a message temporal integrity protocol based on special message encoding, modulation, and detection.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, we introduced the property of physical-layer message integrity, together with the more specialized notion of message temporal message integrity. Both message properties are preserved if the message is not manipulated by the attacker (e.g. neither advanced nor delayed) in transmission over the communication channel. We further proposed and analyzed the message temporal integrity (MTI) Protocol that allows to verify the temporal integrity of messages transmitted over a wireless communication channel. The MTI protocol leverages messages using energy-based modulation, which is inherently hard to remove from the channel for the attacker. In future work, we plan to demonstrated the proposed MTI protocol in a prototype implementation. In addition, we hope to find similar solutions for different aspects of the physical layer message integrity, such as angle-of-arrival.