دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی در مورد مکانیزم های حسابرسی بهینه برای مالیات های محیطی - الزویر 2017

Abstract

We consider the auditing problem of an environmental enforcement agency with Öxed audit resources: How to decide which Örms to audit after having observed the Örmsí taxable emissions reports. The goal of the agency is to implement the socially e¢ cient emissions level. The audit mechanism is the agencyís sole choice variable, while other variables such as the tax rate on emissions and the Öne for non-compliance are determined by other governmental actors. The Önes and budget of the agency are constrained in such a way that the common random audit mechanism fails to implement socially e¢ cient emissions. Assuming perfect information among the Örms, we derive an optimal audit mechanism capable of implementing the socially e¢ cient emissions level. The optimal audit mechanism creates a contest exploiting the strategic interdependencies between the Örms, where the probability of winning (not being audited) for each Örm depends on costly e§orts (their taxable emissions reports).

Conclusion

We have derived the optimal audit mechanism for EPAs with limited audit resources that can meet their objective of lowering the firms’ emissions to the socially efficient level. The fines and budget of the EPA are constrained in such a way that the common random audit mechanism (RAM) fails to implement the socially efficient emissions level. In terms of policy implications, the insights gained in this paper question the common practice of EPAs to keep their auditing mechanisms confidential. This paper makes the case that publicly announced audit mechanisms can induce strategic behaviour among firms, which can improve the effectiveness of auditing efforts. In our model, we abstract from elements of the environmental enforcement issue that are complementary to our analysis. Some of these are as follows. While the optimal audit mechanism induces firms to choose socially efficient emissions, it does not induce truthful reporting when audit resources are low. This may be a limitation of the optimal audit mechanism especially if there are social costs attached to untruthful emission reports. However, while it has been argued elsewhere that emission reports are not useful for the EPA because they are not truthful, we contradict this notion and find that the reports can be used to implement efficient behaviour even though they are not truthful. They can be used to implement and harness strategic effects between the firms in order to achieve better outcomes for the environment. Considering the social cost of untruthful reporting could be an avenue for future research. In addition, in our model firms are assumed to be symmetric given the common practice by EPAs of sorting firms for auditing purposes according to observable characteristics, such as industry and size.