دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی گردش اجرایی شرکت های دولتی چینی: دولت گرا یا بازار گرا؟ - الزویر 2018

ABSTRACT

Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China’s SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed Chinese SOEs from 1999 to 2012, and find that about half of the SOE executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with government recommendations. Moreover, we find that more than a third of executives leave after less than one term, and nearly 20% after more than two terms, highlighting the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. We also find that the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently under different levels of government intervention. SOEs under weak intervention, such as those controlled indirectly by governments, controlled with low shareholdings, from non-regulated industries or in the Eastern regions, prefer the market-oriented evaluation method, which places more weight on executives’ economic performance. In contrast, those under strong intervention prefer the government-oriented evaluation method, which is characterized by policy burden.

Conclusion

According to the theoretical framework of institutional economics, institutional arrangements determine the level of participation. Executives, especially the Chairman and CEO, influence the operational performance and market value of firms to a large extent. Incentive mechanisms concerning executive turnover can influence the behavior of executives, which affects firm value. As a result, it is necessary to examine the institutional changes and executive turnover of SOEs to better understand the behavior of SOEs and explain their performance. In this paper, we collect the executive turnover data of Chinese listed SOEs from 1999 to 2012. Based on the current regulations, we find that about half of executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with the ‘‘Interim Provisions on Business Performance Evaluations for Persons-in-Charge at Central Enterprises” (2003, 2006, 2009, 2012). However, more than a third of executives leave office in less than one term, and about 20% of executives serve more than two terms, which highlights the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. Second, the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently according to the different levels of government intervention. The executive turnover in SOEs with weak intervention by local governments, such as those controlled indirectly or with low government shareholdings and those from non-regulated industries and the Eastern regions, tends to be market-oriented and determined by economic performance. In contrast, the SOEs under strong government intervention prefer to conduct government-oriented executive evaluations that focus on political performance in relation to different policy burdens.