دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی اثرات نقدینگی تجارت بر زمان بندی تجارت داخلی - امرالد 2018

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the underlying option impacts an insider’s propensity to purchase and sell before corporate announcements, the proportion of insiders’ trading after announcements relative to before announcements, and the insider’s profitability around corporate announcements. Design/methodology/approach – The authors test whether the timing information and option have impacted on the tendency of insider trade, the percentage of all shares traded by insiders in the post-announcement to pre-announcement periods and the average cumulative abnormal stock returns during the pre-announcement period. Findings – Insiders’ propensity to trade before announcements is higher for stocks without options listed than for stocks with traded options. This result is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones. The proportion of insiders’ trade volume after announcements relative to before announcements in stocks that have not options listed is higher than those in stocks with traded options. The positive relationship between the insiders’ signed volume and the informational content of corporate announcements is stronger in stocks without traded options than in stocks with options listed. Insider trades prior to unscheduled announcement are more profitable than those before scheduled ones. Research limitations/implications – The paper examines whether there is a difference between the effects of optioned stock and non-optioned stock. Roll et al. (2010) use the relative trading volume of options to stock ratio (O/S) to proxy for informed options trading activity. Future research could explore the impact of O/S. Moreover, the authors examine how insiders with private information use such information to trade in their own firms. Mehta et al. (2017) argue that insiders also use private information to facilitate trading (shadow trading) in linked firms, such as supply chain partners or competitors. Therefore, future research could consider the impact of shadow trading. Social implications – Since the insider’s propensity to buy before announcements in stocks without options listed is larger than in stocks with traded options and the relationship is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones, the efforts of regulators should focus on monitoring insider trading in stocks without options listed prior to unscheduled announcements. Originality/value – First, Lei and Wang (2014) find that the increasing pattern of insider’s propensity to trade before unscheduled announcements is larger than that before scheduled announcements. The authors document the underlying option has impacted the insider’s propensity to purchase and sell, and the relationship is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones. Second, related studies show insider’s trading activity has shifted from periods before corporate announcements to periods after corporate announcements to decrease litigation risk. This paper find the underlying option has influenced the proportion of insiders’ trading after announcements relative to before announcements when the illegal insider trade-related penalties increase.

Conclusion

In this study, we utilize the insider trading data of companies that comprise the S&P 500 index to explore the difference between the insider trading in optioned and non-optioned stocks around scheduled and unscheduled corporate announcements. We study four issues in sequence. First, the insider’s propensity to buy before announcements is larger for stocks without options listed than for stocks with traded options. This result is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones. The results for the insider’s probability to sell are similar (but weaker) with the results for the insider’s probability to buy. Second, for the insiders’ buy trades, insiders are more likely to trade in the pre-announcement period rather than in the post-announcement period when the volume of liquidity trading in the pre-unscheduled announcement period is higher. Moreover, there is a stronger effect of liquidity trading on the post-announcement period for scheduled announcements than for unscheduled announcements. The proportion of insiders’ trade volume after announcements relative to before announcements in stocks without options listed is higher than those in stocks with traded options. The result is stronger for unscheduled announcements than for scheduled ones. For the insiders’ sale trade, the above coefficients are not as significant as those for the insiders’ buy trade, indicating the effects for insiders’ sales are weaker than those for buy trades. Third, there is a positive relationship between the insiders’ signed volume and the informational content of unscheduled announcements. The positive relationship is stronger before unscheduled announcements than before scheduled ones. Moreover, the positive relationship between the insiders’ signed volume and the informational content of announcements is stronger in stocks without traded options than in stocks with options listed. The difference between the effect in stocks without traded options and the effect in stocks with options listed is more outstanding before unscheduled announcements than before scheduled announcements.