Conclusions
The global financial crisis highlighted the risks of maturity mismatches and unstable funding mix on banks’ balance sheets. This has lead to changes in the regulatory and supervisory frameworks governing bank liquidity. In addition, the combined role of structural liquidity and capital cushions under Basel III aims to reduce potential bank distress and promote financial stability. Despite the prolonged period of financial instability, unlike in the US, outright bank failures have been rare in Europe. To evaluate the impact of Basel III structural liquidity and capital ratios on bank stability, in this paper we utilise a broader definition of failure and distress to include banks under receivership, bankrupt, dissolved, or in liquidation. If a bank was ‘dissolved by merger’ we classify it as F&D banks only if the merger was driven by distress. Finally, we incorporate information on state aid and, for large banks, information on EBA stress tests. These criteria allow us to test the relationship between structural liquidity and capital ratios as introduced by Basel III on banks’ probability of default. The results of the analysis are of particular interest to both academics and policy makers as they contribute to the current debate on the effectiveness of the combined role of Basel III structural liquidity and capital cushions in promoting bank stability, Contrary to expectations, we find that capital and liquidity ratios play a complementary role in fostering bank stability only for the largest banks. When considering all banks our results indicate.