ترجمه مقاله اپلیکیشن های تاکسی، مقررات و بازار سفرهای تاکسی - نشریه الزویر

This paper attempts to provide a starting point for discussion on how smartphone-based taxi applications (‘apps’) have changed the market for taxi journeys and the resulting implications for taxi market regulation. The paper focuses on the taxi apps and their impact on taxi markets. It provides a brief history of taxi regulation before outlining the underlying economic rationales of its current form in many parts of the world, characterised as the “QQE” framework (quantity, quality and economic controls on operators). It argues that current regulation assumes that taxi markets are subject to three sets of problems that require correction by regulatory intervention, namely: those associated with credence goods, problems related to open access and those resulting from transactions occurring in a thin market. It is then proposed that taxi apps solve both the credence good and thin market problems whilst largely mitigating the problems associated with open access. The paper then presents some potential problems for taxi apps, namely the potential for instability on supply and demand sides, collusion and monopoly. It also discusses concerns about driver background checks and safety. The paper concludes by arguing that instead of restricting the growth of the taxi market, regulators should focus on reducing the likelihood of monopoly and collusion in a taxi market led by apps.

1. Introduction

By early 2013, 61% of cellphone subscribers in the US were using smartphones (Nielsen, 2013). Similar trends of rapid growth are apparent worldwide (IDS, 2014). The growth of the global smartphone market has been accompanied by an increasingly diverse and sophisticated market for smartphone applications (henceforth ‘‘apps”): pieces of software that are downloaded onto personal devices for free or for a small charge in order to perform a specific niche task, typically related to entertainment, communication, mapping or locating services and retailers. There are a number of transport apps which aim to connect smartphone users seeking a ride with users in the locality who are prepared to provide one. The supplier can operate in a similar manner to a taxi: using the app to locate passengers, drive them to their destinations and charge them according to a fare structure based on the time and distance of the trip (as measured by the app) set by the app provider. Similarly, the passenger can use the app like a taxi service in order to request a ride. The app sends the request to the nearest available driver who then either accepts or declines the trip. In recent years, taxi apps have become well established: Uber, the market leader, reports 1.1 m ride requests per week generated by its 3.8 m users (Tiku, 2013). As of December 2014, it was operating in 230 cities across fifty countries (Uber, 2014a). Competitor, Lyft operates in thirty US states (Lyft, 2014) and Hailo is present in a dozen major cities across Europe, the US and Asia (Hailo, 2014). In China, Didi Dache and Kuaidi Dachecombined have 150 m users (Russell, 2015); Ola Cabs and TaxiForSure are major aggregators present in multiple Indian cities (Shrivastava, 2015).

6. Conclusions

The major rationales for regulation of taxi markets are: the need to mitigate problems associated with ‘‘credence goods”; to correct issues arising from open access; and to ensure returns for suppliers operating in a thin market. These rationales result in the regulation of taxi numbers, fares and service standards, a regulatory framework that has been in place since the early 1930s. Taxi apps have brought about a significant change in the market, which has implications for the existing regulatory framework. The thickening of the market for taxi trips mitigates the need for quantity restrictions. Sparse and geographically spread demand can be met with supply at the appropriate price. Post-trip feedback, in high volumes, helps to maintain service standards across a range of levels, removing the need for regular external checks. The serious crime problem appears to be an issue for the industry as a whole and not merely restricted to taxi apps, though more empirical work is needed on the issue. The high volumes of trips in a thick market of individual operators without fare controls would keep price volatility low. If these trip volumes are catered for by apps which are in competition, then strict price controls may not be necessary.