دانلود رایگان مقاله تعادل بازار تاکسی با خدمات ارزیابی شخص ثالث

عنوان فارسی
تعادل بازار تاکسی با خدمات ارزیابی شخص ثالث
عنوان انگلیسی
Taxi market equilibrium with third-party hailing service
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
21
سال انتشار
2017
نشریه
الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
کد محصول
E5207
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اقتصاد
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله
اقتصاد پولی
مجله
تحقیقات حمل و نقل بخش B: روش شناسی - Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
دانشگاه
Lyles school of Civil Engineering
کلمات کلیدی
بازی چند رهبر پیرو، تاکسی، توازن TMC ، مشکل تعادل ناس تعمیم یافته، قیمت گذاری بالا، نقطه کاملا ثابت
چکیده

abstract


 With the development and deployment of new technologies, the oligopolistic taxi industry is transforming into a shared market with coexistence of both traditional taxi service (TTS) and app-based third-party taxi service (ATTS). The ATTS is different from TTS in both entry policy and fare setting, and brings competition into the market. To account for the revolution of the taxi industry, in this study, we analyze the characteristics of the TTS and ATTS, model the taxi market as a multiple-leader-follower game at the network level, and investigate the equilibrium of taxi market with competition (TMC Equilibrium). In particular, passengers are modeled as the leaders who seek to minimize their travel cost associated with taxi rides. Followers involve TTS and ATTS drivers, who compete for passengers to maximize their revenue. The network model captures selfish behavior of passengers and drivers in the taxi market, and we prove the existence of TMC Equilibrium for the proposed model using variational inequality formulations. An iterative algorithm is further developed to find the TMC Equilibrium, which corresponds to the strongly stationary point of the multi-leader-follower game. Based on numerical results, it is observed that fleet size and pricing policy are closely associated with the level of competition in the market and may have significant impact on total passengers cost, average waiting time, and fleet utilization.

نتیجه گیری

6. Conclusion


In this paper, we model the taxi market with TTS and ATTS as the multi-leader-follower game at the network level and investigate the TMC Equilibrium. Specifically, taxi drivers and passengers are considered as players in the game and are assumed to have greedy behavior. We formulated the problem using quasi-variational inequality, analyzed the game structure and model properties, and proved that the TM-L/F game has a TMC Equilibrium. Seeing the difficulties of solving multi-leader-follower game, we decomposed the problem as solving two parameterized augmented VIs, and developed an iterative algorithm to find the strongly stationary point of the problem.


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