دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی بیمه اجتماعی، بیمه درمانی خصوصی و رفاه فردی - الزویر 2017

عنوان فارسی
بیمه اجتماعی، بیمه درمانی خصوصی و رفاه فردی
عنوان انگلیسی
Social insurance, private health insurance and individual welfare
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
33
سال انتشار
2017
نشریه
الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
نوع مقاله
ISI
نوع نگارش
مقالات پژوهشی (تحقیقاتی)
رفرنس
دارد
پایگاه
اسکوپوس
کد محصول
E10129
رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله
مدیریت، اقتصاد
گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله
بیمه، اقتصاد مالی
مجله
مجله دینامیک و کنترل اقتصادی - Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control
دانشگاه
Department of Economics - The University of Connecticut - United States
کلمات کلیدی
پس انداز، هزینه های پزشکی متغیر، بیمه درمانی، آزمون وسع
doi یا شناسه دیجیتال
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2017.03.004
چکیده

Abstract


This paper studies the impact of social insurance on individual choices and welfare in a dynamic general equilibrium model with uncertain medical expenses and individual health insurance choices. I find that social insurance (modeled as the combination of a minimum consumption floor and the Medicaid program) does not only distort saving and labor supply decisions, but also has a large crowding out effect on the demand for private health insurance. However, despite the distorting effects, the net welfare consequence of eliminating social insurance is still negative in most cases. In addition, the large crowding out effect on private health insurance suggests that the existence of social insurance programs may be one reason why some Americans do not buy any health insurance.

نتیجه گیری

Conclusion


In this paper, I examine the social insurance programs in a dynamic general equilibrium with endogenous health insurance choices. I find that social insurance (modeled as the combination of a minimum consumption floor and the Medicaid program) does not only distort saving and labor supply decisions, but also crowds out private health insurance coverage. However, despite the distorting effects, the net welfare consequence of removing social insurance is still negative in most cases studied in the paper. In addition, I find that the crowding out effect of social insurance on private health insurance is quantitatively large because means-tested social insurance programs do not only affect individuals who are already qualified for the programs, but also influence the decisions of individuals who will potentially become qualified after being hit by a series of large negative shocks. This finding implies that the existence of social insurance programs may be one of the reasons why many Americans do not buy any health insurance.


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