دانلود رایگان مقاله مدیریت درآمد با مینیماکس میزان تاسف در مذاکرات

عنوان فارسی
مدیریت درآمد با مینیماکس میزان تاسف در مذاکرات
عنوان انگلیسی
Revenue management with minimax regret negotiations
صفحات مقاله فارسی
0
صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
11
سال انتشار
2016
نشریه
الزویر - Elsevier
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی
PDF
کد محصول
E4443
رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله
مدیریت
مجله
مجله امگا - Omega
دانشگاه
دانشگاه کیدیر، استانبول، ترکیه
کلمات کلیدی
اختصاص دادن، پیشنهاد قیمت، مدیریت منابع
۰.۰ (بدون امتیاز)
امتیاز دهید
چکیده

abstract


We study the dynamic bilateral price negotiations from the perspective of a monopolist seller. We first study the classical static problem with an added uncertainty feature. Next, we review the dynamic negotiation problem, and propose a simple deterministic “fluid” analog. The main emphasis of the paper is in analyzing the relationship of the dynamic negotiation problem and the classical revenue management problems; and expanding the formulation to the case where both the buyer and seller have limited prior information on their counterparty valuation. Our first result shows that if both the seller and buyer are bidding so as to minimize their maximum regret, then it is optimal for them to bid as if the unknown valuation distributions were uniform. Building on this result and the fluid formulation of the dynamic negotiation problem, we characterize the seller’s minimum acceptable price at any given point in time.

نتیجه گیری

5. Conclusion


In this paper, we study a monopolist seller’s revenue management problem with the twist that transactions between the seller and each arriving buyer are bilaterally negotiated, a situation that has not been fully considered in the extant literature. We start with the one-to-one negotiation problems and discuss how to account for uncertainty in valuation distributions. Next, we extend our analysis to the dynamic environment: we establish the connection of the bilateral negotiation problems with the classical revenue management problems; and by studying the deterministic fluid problem, we observe the stationary nature of the optimal pricing policy. We are then able to extend the analysis to uncertain environments. Finally, two sets of numerical analyzes complement the theoretical study in other interesting perspectives, answering the questions “how the impact of parameter k in a dynamic setting might be different than in a static setting” and “how the uniform distribution assumption might affect the performance of the seller”.


بدون دیدگاه