- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
We present a model to optimize a competitor’s behavior in a network revenuemanagement game within an airline alliance. In particular, we model two forms ofcompetition; horizontal competition with parallel substitutable flights and verticalcompetition with both competitors operating adjacent connecting flights in a codesharing agreement. We compute pure Nash equilibria with an iterative algorithmpresented in an earlier paper. A computational study shows that the algorithm isalso suited for computing Nash equilibria taking both types of competition intoaccount and that code sharing increases revenues for both competitors. However,the difference decreases as the network size and mean demand increase.
4 Conclusion and Outlook
We have presented a model to optimize a competitor’s booking limits when it facescompetition from an alliance partner. Both, horizontal and vertical competition was con-sidered. In horizontal competition the competitors offer parallel and substitutable prod-ucts and thus compete directly for customers, while in vertical competition the partnersoperate connecting, adjacent flights and one airline might sell tickets for products occu-pying the partner’s aircraft. Here, a capacity competition arises because customers forthe code shared products and local customers must be seated in the same plane. We dis-tinguished the code shared products after their origin and destination into inbound andoutbound products. Assuming that the code shared products generated the same revenuelike the corresponding local products, we were able to reduce the number of decisionvariables for the inbound code shared products.