دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی اهداف یارانه دولتی و عملکرد شرکت - تیلور و فرانسیس 2017

ABSTRACT

This study examines the effect of a government subsidy’s purpose on firm performance. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2012, we find that a government subsidy affects firm performance. Specifically, a government subsidy is negatively associated with firm performance, and such a negative effect is primarily driven by a non-specified type of subsidy. Further, such an effect is more pronounced for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) compared with nonSOEs. The government quality has a positive effect on the likelihood of a specified subsidy and the performance impact of a non-specified subsidy. Further analyses suggest that a non-specified subsidy reduces investment efficiency and results in rent-seeking activities. This study sheds light on the effect of government subsidies from a new perspective, and has important policy implications for regulators to improve the effectiveness of government subsidies.

6. Conclusion

Based on the perspective of subsidy heterogeneity, by using 10,130 observations of China listed firms from 2007 to 2012, this paper examines the effect of different categories of subsidies on corporate performance, and tests the government quality’s effect on the efficiency of subsidy. We find that the purpose of a subsidy affects the efficiency of subsidy, and a subsidy with a definite purpose has better efficiency than a subsidy without a definite purpose. For a subsidy without a definite purpose, due to poor binding, funds are more easily distorted in the process of actual use, thus reducing the efficiency of subsidies. In contrast, definite purposes and conditions of subsidies weaken the possibility of alienation of subsidy funds, so as to ensure the efficiency of the subsidy, and realise the role of subsidies in making up for a lack of market regulation. Specifically, a subsidy with a definite purpose received by listed firms has an insignificant effect on corporate performance, while a subsidy without a definite purpose that they received has a significantly negative effect on corporate accounting performance. We also investigated that the efficiency of a subsidy without a definite purpose is susceptible to being influenced by the nature of property rights. Compared with non-SOEs, a subsidy without a definite purpose in SOEs has a worse efficiency. SOEs can gain more subsidies without a definite purpose, which forcibly changes the market principles of fund allocation by virtue of ‘political contact’ or ‘nature of property rights’ and other informal ways. Then funds deviate from the purpose of maximising its value, and the end result must be public funding mismatches and inefficiencies. Although non-SOEs also can gain the subsidy without a definite purpose, compared with SOEs, non-SOEs will face more political intervention, and more social responsibility The policy burden under government intervention will control the flow of subsidy and reduce the possibility of funds being alienated in the process of actual use, thus ensuring the efficiency of subsidy. In addition, the improvement of government quality has a positive effect on the definiteness of a subsidy and efficiency of a subsidy without a definite purpose.