4 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
EU citizenship law has been built on the right, for Member States' nationals, to move and reside freely across the Union. These freedoms—and other, associated substantive rights—are balanced, in primary and secondary law, by limits and conditions. While the reach and nature of these limits and conditions have not always been crystal clear, a trend has emerged over recent years where criminal conduct is key to both these concepts.
Starting with the Tsakouridis judgment, the Court seems to have drawn a line between a prior approach to crime and citizenship rights, more favourable to the person concerned, to a subsequent, restrictive and (apparently) value‐based one. To analyse and locate the CJEU's approach, the article has used a crime–citizenship spectrum, at the ends of which Duff's and Jakobs' accounts of punishment—hereby understood in its broader sense—have been placed. On the one hand, Duff's approach advocates for a criminal law built upon an inclusive understanding of community and citizenship and includes reformation of the wrongdoer in the purposes of punishment. On the other, Jakobs' theory distinguishes between the citizen and the enemy: while the former is still in a dialogue with the community and ‘deserves’ the application of ordinary criminal law, the latter is a threatening individual (a person no longer recognised by the legal order) requiring pure incapacitation.
