دانلود رایگان مقاله طرح به اشتراک گذاری ظرفیت مبتنی بر قیمت گذاری اولویتی برای شبکه بی سیم بدن

Abstract

In this paper, a radio resource allocation scheme for wireless body area networks (WBANs) is proposed. Unlike existing works in the literature, we focus on the communications in beyond-WBANs, and study the transmission scheduling under a scenario that there are a large number of gateways associating with one base station of medical centers. Motivated by the distinctions and requirements of beyond-WBAN communications, we introduce a priority-aware pricing-based capacity sharing scheme by taking into account the quality of service (QoS) requirements for different gateways. In the designed scheme, each gateway is intelligent to select transmission priorities and data rates according to its signal importance, and is charged by a price with regard to its transmission request. The capacity allocation is proceeded with guarantee of the absolute priority rule. In order to maximize the individual utility, gateways will compete with each other by choosing the optimal transmission strategies. Such decision process is formulated as a non-atomic game. Theoretical analyses show that our proposed pricing-based scheme can lead to an efficient Wardrop equilibrium. Through numerical results, we examine the convergence of strategy decisions, and demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism in improving the utilities of gateways.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, a pricing-based resource allocation scheme for eHealth systems has been proposed. To char- acterize the feature of medical-grade priority in beyond- WBAN communications, we introduce the concept of net- work economics in the capacity sharing among multiple on-body gateways. The utility functions of gateways are formulated, and the strategy decision process is built up as a non-atomic pricing game. Theoretical and simulation re- sults show that our proposed allocation scheme will pro- duce an efficient Wardrop equilibrium, and can improve the utilities of gateways under medical emergencies. In our future works, we will consider to extend the pricing scheme to a more complex scenario where the unit prices for traffics in different transmission priorities are strategic decisions of the base station. In addition, in or- der to prevent the untruthful behaviors from smart gate- ways (i.e., misreporting their packet severities), the design of incentive-compatible mechanisms for medical packet transmissions will also be discussed.