- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
Although partially disabled individuals in Spain are allowed to combine disability benefits with a job, the empirical evidence shows that the employment rate of this group of individuals is very low because they have much lower job finding and higher job separation rates than nondisabled workers. Moreover, a decomposition analysis of the equilibrium employment rate shows that the differences in the job finding rates explain 85 percent of the disabled employment gap. To explain these facts, we construct a labor market model with search intensity and matching frictions to identify the incentives and disincentives to work in Spain from the point of view of both disabled workers and employers. According to the model, the high employment rate gap observed between nondisabled and disabled individuals can be partly explained by the presence of a lower level of productivity among disabled individuals that discourages them from looking for jobs. In terms of policy interventions, sensitivity analysis shows that, since the disability condition is permanent, one-off subsidies in new hired positions have a much lower impact on the employment rate and welfare of disabled individuals than long-term policies.
In Spain there are approximately 1 million disabled individuals receiving disability benefits; around half of them are partially disabled individuals who are allowed to combine the receipt of disability benefits with a job. The country reports, however, an average employment rate of just 13.6 percent for this group of people from 2001 to 2011, which is much lower than the employment rate of 75.3 percent observed for nondisabled employees in the same period. In this paper we analyze the incentives and disincentives to work experienced by disabled individuals in Spain. We first present a set of indicators that compare Spanish labor market behavior for partially disabled and nondisabled individuals from 2001 to 2011. We find that the job finding rate for disabled workers is much lower than the rate for nondisabled workers, while the job separation rate is higher. Moreover, the decomposition analysis of the equilibrium employment rate shows that the job finding rate explains 85 percent of the disabled employment gap. We also find that only 4.8 percent of the employees who become partially disabled continue working in the same firm after the disabling condition. In order to understand the labor market differences observed in the data, we construct a labor market model with search intensity and matching frictions where disabled and nondisabled individuals compete for the same jobs. We also include in the model the hiring decisions made by companies and the incentives available in the legislation to hire disabled workers. We calibrate the model to match a number of stylized facts observed in the Spanish labor market.