دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی پولشویی از طریق مدیریت استراتژیک معاملات حسابداری - الزویر 2018

abstract

We develop new transaction management (TRM) proxies, to find empirical evidence of the strategic management of accounting transactions, aiming to carry out money laundering activities, within a sample of 355 firms controlled by Italian Mafias. Our results reveal that, using a cluster analysis, Mafia-controlled firms can be classified into two different groups corresponding to real firms and shell firms, based on specific assumptions on their distinctive peculiarities. Importantly, our regression estimations provide evidence of different TRM practices of these firms, which may be linked to specific money laundering activities. Finally, the seizure of Mafia-controlled firms and their assignment to legal administrators only have a significant impact on TRM within Mafiacontrolled shell firms, whereas the null impact on TRM, within Mafia-controlled real firms, casts doubt on the ability of legal administrators to completely deter money laundering. This study proposes new TRM proxies, based on the nature of the expenditure transaction, which could be used by authorities as accounting red flags of money laundering activities. Furthermore, this study may support critical arguments against the orthodox view of the anti-money laundering role of accounting and the suitability of traditional TRM proxies to depict practices within firms sharing common traits with Mafia-controlled firms. Indeed, these firms may engage in TRM for illicit and/or opportunistic purposes, when the external scrutiny is weak, their financial statements are irrelevant for trading with stakeholders, because of competitive advantages or dominant market positions, and they can count on colluded actors as counterparties of money laundering transactions.

Conclusions

In this study, we hypothesize that specific TRM patterns may provide evidence of money laundering practices within a sample of 355 firms controlled by Italian Mafias. Our results reveal that, using a cluster analysis, MCFs can be classified into two distinct groups which may correspond to MCRFs and MCSFs, based on specific assumptions on the peculiarities of the shell firms compared to the real firms. Furthermore, our regression estimations show that pre-seizure MCRFs engage more in TRM by exhibiting abnormally high raw material/merchandise costs and personnel costs, and abnormally low service costs with a null cumulative effect on reported cash flow from operations (CFO) relative to sales. Conversely, pre-seizure MCSFs exhibit abnormally low material/merchandise costs and personnel costs, and abnormally high service costs with a negative cumulative effect on CFO relative to sales. In addition, the seizure of MCFs and the intervention of legal administrators have no significant impact on TRM proxies within MCRFs, by casting doubt on the ability of legal administrators to completely deter money laundering practices. On the other hand, abnormal material/merchandise costs and personnel costs significantly increase within post-seizure MCSFs, presumably for the interruption of the fictitious business transactions linked to money laundering. More importantly, we provide plausible explanations of the specific money laundering practices that may be evidenced by these TRM patterns within both MCRFs and MCSFs.