دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی مشارکت سهامداران اقلیت و مدیریت درآمد: آزمون تئوری پذیرش - امرالد 2018

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to test a catering theory by examining impacts of minority shareholders’ pressures on earnings management (EM), and attempt to answer: what is the role of minority shareholders participation (MSP) in corporate governance? and does MSP serve as an external monitor to managers, or does it put excessive pressure on them? Design/methodology/approach – Using a novel online voting data set in China’s stock market, the author constructs the measure of MSP, and regress the EM on MSP. To address the endogeneity, the author introduces propensity score matching and difference-in-difference methods, instrumental variables, and Heckman estimation to show that the results are robust to different specifications and alternative measures. Findings – The author documents that: MSP plays limited role in external monitoring; and firms facing high MSP levels tend to manage earnings more actively. In addition, information asymmetry, proposals’ importance, managerial incentives, and CEO financial expertise significantly affect firms’ catering behaviors. Originality/value – This paper contributes to different strands of the literature. First, the finding significantly supports the catering hypothesis from a new perspective of EM. Second, the author contributes to a hotly debated issue in corporate governance: whether minority shareholders should be granted increased participation in corporate decisions? The results also provide timely empirical evidence for government regulators who are concerned about the costs and benefits of granting minority shareholders direct control over corporate decisions.

7. Conclusion

The aim of this study is to shed light on whether MSP affects the decisions of firms. Specifically, we consider the following important questions. What is the role of MSP in corporate governance? Does MSP serve as an external monitor to managers or does it place excessive pressure on them? Do firms cater to minority shareholders by EM when the shareholders cannot effectively identify the EM?

We use a unique data set, the online voting data set in SZSE from 2006 to 2011, to investigate the impact of MSP on firms’ EM, through which we find that firms with high levels of MSP tend to manage earnings better. We address the potential endogeneity in our results using the lagged variable approach, propensity score matching and DID methods, two IVs based on share split and the number of shareholder accounts, and Heckman twostep procedure. Based on estimations using all the alternative measures and different methods, we find that our results are robust.

This paper offers valuable information regarding the highly debated issue of allowing minority shareholders to have direct control in corporate governance. Our results are directly relevant to the CSRC and related regulators who encounter the challenge of protecting the interests of minority shareholders. Given China’s poor level of investor protection and weak law enforcement, we demonstrate how strengthening the direct control of minority shareholders over corporate decisions can drive the EM of listed firms in countries with such an environment.