دانلود رایگان مقاله برنامه دخالت مستقیم و غیر مستقیم دولت در رقابت زنجیره های تامین سبز و غیر سبز

Abstract

This study investigates equilibrium between green and non-green product types under different government intervention schemas. To this end, we establish production competition models of a set of green and non-green supply chains (GSCs and NGSCs, respectively). GSCs and NGSCs are two-echelon supply chains (SCs) that present green and non-green types of a product to a market, respectively. We consider two schemas of governmental intervention: direct tariffs (DTs) and tradable permits (TPs), both with and without baselines. This research seeks to evaluate how the GSCs and NGSCs respond to the DT or TP schemas. To establish the best SC response strategies, we formulate three-level non-linear programming problems for four possible governmental intervention scenarios. We find that this problem is multidimensional with different system stakeholders including the government, SCs, consumers, and the environment. In fact, different schemas result in different satisfaction levels of stakeholders. Thus, an appropriate schema can be selected by considering corresponding effects on the stakeholders. The comprehensive evaluation of a case study on residential building construction SCs yields significant managerial insights.

7. Conclusion

This study evaluates the competition between GSCs and NGSCs under different intervention schemas of the government including DT and TP. Each NGSC or GSC comprises one supplier who sets the wholesale price of components as well as one manufacturer who decides the number of products to be produced and supplied to the market. We established a Stackelberg game theory framework in which the government and SCs are considered as leader and follower players, respectively. We presented four mathematical models regarding DT and TP schemas with and without baselines. Although the mechanisms of both DT and TP schemas are different, the equilibrium production quantities, wholesale and market prices of SCs can be computed for a given strategy of the government (Theorems 1-10). From this 34 study, we found that DT or TP policy making is a multidimensional problem with different system stakeholders, including the government, SCs, consumers, and the environment. Although both TP and DT schemas can change market equilibrium between green and non37 green products, the government’s intervention is lesser in TP schema.