5. Conclusions
This paper provides supporting evidence for the prediction of Desender et al. (2013) that the ownership structure of corporations must be considered in examining the effectiveness of corporate governance. Specifically, the current paper examines the role of OC on the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms (board of directors, audit committee and IAF characteristics) and the demand for audit quality measured by audit fees. First, we examine the direct impact of OC and corporate governance effectiveness on audit fees. It is reported that OC is negatively related to the demand for extensive audit service. Our findings are consistent with previous literature, that the firms with effective corporate governance are more likely to pay higher audit fees; this supports the complementary view between internal governance mechanisms and external auditing (Hay et al., 2008; Srinidhi et al., 2014; Wahab et al., 2011). Second, we test the impact of OC on the association between a firm’s governance and audit fees. Empirical evidence suggests that ownership structure plays an essential role in forming a firm’s governance and how it monitors managers. Specifically, firms with high OC moderate the positive relationship between governance and the demand for extensive audit service. The results also show that the presence of insider controlling shareholders will replace the complementary association between the firm’s governance and the demand for audit quality in a substitution association. The findings of further analysis support the main results. Generally, the findings of this study provide good insights into the role of OC in forming an association between internal governance mechanisms and audit quality in Malaysian firms.