دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی تاثیر مشخصات هیئت مدیره و هویت مالکیت بر هزینه های سازمان و عملکرد شرکت - امرالد 2018

Abstract

Purpose – This paper aims to provide a twofold empirical comparison: first, a comparison between the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs proxies and firm performance measures, and second, this comparison was used before and after the 2008 financial crisis, capturing two different economic states. Design/methodology/approach – Panel regression methods were applied to two data sets of nonfinancial firms incorporated in the FTSE ALL-Share index over the period 2005-2011. Findings – The results provide evidence that not all mechanisms lead to lower agency conflicts and/or higher firm performance. Ownership identity has a significant impact and the role of the governance mechanisms changes with the changes in the economic conditions surrounding the firm. Research limitations/implications – The results lend support to the notion that forcing a certain code of practice on firms to follow could compel them to move away from conflict reduction governance structures. Originality/value – To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a comparison of empirical evidence for the impact of board characteristics and ownership identity on agency costs and firm performance by using a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms. This comparison challenges the prior studies that use performance as an indirect proxy for lower agency costs. Additionally, it compares the impact of the governance mechanisms during two different economic conditions.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper is twofold; this paper contrasts the effectiveness of a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating the agency conflicts related to work shirking and investment decisions on one side and firm performance on the other side. This challenges prior studies that have utilised firm performance and/or value as indirect proxies of agency costs. Besides, using a two-period framework, this paper investigates the impact of economic conditions on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating the agency conflicts and enhancing firm performance. This study provides empirical evidence that supports the agency theory and resource dependence theory in terms of board characteristics and that failed to support the stewardship theory in terms of CEO duality. The results demonstrate that large boards reduce agency costs and enhance firm value, whereas compliance with the recommended board composition by the UK Corporate Governance Code enhances firm value for the post-crisis period but increases the agency costs of the post-crisis period. Interestingly, an effective audit committee reduces agency costs for both samples but decrease firm profitability after the crisis. There is some evidence that the compliance with the recommendations of the remuneration and nomination committees enhances firm performance. There is modest evidence that duality is detrimental to firm performance. Before the financial crisis, the presence of block holders helped in reducing the agency costs. However, block holders turned to be a source of agency conflicts after the financial crisis. Board ownership seems to have a significant role in reducing the agency costs and enhancing firm performance after the financial crisis. In terms of owner identity, the results show that individual block holders are more effective in performing their monitoring role, and their presence protects dispersed shareholders from the opportunistic behaviour of institutional block holders. The results also provide evidence supporting the entrenchment hypothesis of the managerial ownership and the control and the expropriation hypotheses of the block holding ownership.