دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی شکل های دموکراسی و نوسانات رشد اقتصادی - الزویر 2018

ABSTRACT

Using a panel of 140 countries over the 1975–2007 period, we disaggregate democracies across five institutional dimensions (government forms, electoral rules, state forms, number of veto players, and age of democracies), to study the precise forms of democracy that may explain the lower economic growth volatility (EGV) in democracies compared to dictatorships, usually emphasized by the literature. We find that, while all government forms decrease EGV to the same extent, proportional electoral rules outperform majoritarian and mixed electoral rules, suggesting a role for a more inclusive political decision-making process. In addition, EGV is significantly lower in unitary states, suggesting a role for a limited separation of power between the central government and the local authorities, while the effect of the number of veto players and the age of democracies is significant only in developed countries. Consequently, the choice between various forms of democracy may not be neutral for EGV, and, possibly, for countries' development path.

6. Conclusion

Several empirical studies emphasized that democracies are associated with significantly lower EGV compared to dictatorships. However, little is said about the specific institutional features of democratic regimes that may explain this stabilizing effect. The goal of this paper was to go beyond the simple dichotomy between democracies and dictatorships, in order to understand which forms of democracy may explain the lower EGV enjoyed by democracies compared to dictatorships. To this end, we used a large panel of 140 countries over the 1975–2007 period, and disaggregated the overall effect of democracies on EGV along five institutional dimensions, namely government forms, electoral rules, state forms, the number of veto players, and the age of democracies. We showed that institutional details are of crucial importance to understand the stabilizing effect of democratic regimes. In particular, two specific forms of democracy, namely proportional electoral rules and unitary states, turned out to be particularly effective (relative to the alternative electoral rules, and state forms, respectively) in reducing EGV compared to dictatorships. Thus, more inclusion of the political decision-making process and a limited separation of power between the central government and the local authorities appeared to be two institutional dimensions that may explain why democracies perform better in reducing EGV with respect to dictatorships. Besides, we found that the various government forms present a comparable stabilizing effect, suggesting limited further gains in terms of EGV reduction related to the extent of separation between the Executive and the Legislative powers. Moreover, the number of veto-players, and the age of democracies were not found to significantly affect EGV, indicating that the number of political actors involved in the political decision-making process and a long-lasting experience of democratic institutions might not robustly explain EGV differences between democracies and dictatorships. Finally, we unveiled heterogeneities related to the level of economic development in the effect of the various forms of democracy on EGV. In particular, contrary to developing countries, in developed countries all forms of democracy significantly reduce EGV compared to dictatorships, and the magnitude of their effect is stronger.