دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی بررسی مدیریت درآمد واقعی و تعهدی: تحلیل بین المللی از مبانی قانونی تحت IFRS - الزویر 2018

ABSTRACT

This study examines the impact of legal origin differences on accrual and real earnings management behaviors for 14 international financial reporting standards (IFRS) countries. Specifically, a cross-country analysis determines the effects of enforcement intensity and IFRS adoption on earnings management (EM) types, depending on code or common law origins. The results indicate that legal origin directly affects EM behaviors, whereas enforcement intensity and IFRS result in different accrual earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM) behaviors depending on the different legal origins. In particular, the findings also suggest that an increase in enforcement strength may not produce similar EM results for each legal tradition, specifically for the expected shift from AEM to REM as recent studies have proposed. This study also offers evidence that IFRS represent a constraint on AEM in code law origin countries, and it highlights a constraint on REM only for common law countries when the enforcement intensity increases.

7. Conclusion

This study provides evidence that legal origin directly impacts EM behaviors on a cross-country basis. The analysis of code and common law legal origins demonstrates that two important financial information quality measures, enforcement intensity and quality accounting standards, generate different AEM and REM behaviors under different legal origins. In other words, the complementary practices of strong enforcement and quality accounting standards might not lead to quality accounting information, as suggested by Hope (2003). Strong enforcement or weak enforcement might evoke similar EM outcomes under different legal origins, which would determine the quality of accounting information. Specifically, this study demonstrates that an increase in enforcement strength may not encourage a shift in EM from AEM to REM, as suggested by Evans et al. (2015). This study detects shifts associated with increases in enforcement only in the cluster analysis of the Size variable in code law countries. However, code law firms might practice REM as a result of managerial discretion, irrespective of the institutional setting. In contrast to Evans et al. (2015), the results indicate that strong enforcement in a common law setting negatively affects total EM, without any substitution from AEM to REM.

This study contributes to extant literature by documenting differences in EM practices among firms in countries that have adopted unified accounting standards under different legal traditions. IFRS was found to constrain EM behavior only in AEM in code law countries, which may be due to new regulations that are enforced along with IFRS adoption, as Ho et al. (2015) emphasize. Differences in legal origin thus might significantly influence EM practices in IFRS countries, which may be due to discrepancies in institutional practices related to enforcement, IFRS implementation, and managerial behavior. In addition, this study suggests the possible effects of institutional practices related to enforcement and IFRS implementation, with the expectation of observing EM differences with respect to legal systems.