دانلود رایگان مقاله توافقنامه بین المللی زیست محیطی با مزایای جانبی

Abstract

Both ancillary and primary benefits, generated by climate change mitigation, are indispensable key factors to implement the full participation in international environmental agreement (IEA). This paper presents a new IEA model with ancillary benefits, using a repeated game with the linear and quadratic emission abatement cost functions of each country. This study also investigates the effect of ancillary benefits on the condition for full participation in IEA. Ancillary benefits function as a complementary device of punishment scheme for IEA. Our main results show that ancillary benefits can facilitate full participation in IEA, thus suggesting that they should be considered in climate change negotiations.

5. Summary and discussion

This paper presents new theoretical findings on the effect of ancillary benefits on IEAs with full participation. We investigate the effect of ancillary benefits in a repeated game framework, applying Penance-m to two types of payoff functions: Case I with linear benefit and cost functions, and Case II with linear benefit and quadratic cost functions. This study draws the following conclusions. First, the results of our study generalize the findings of Asheim and Holtsmark (2009) and Froyn and Hovi (2008). That is, full participation is feasible in Cases I and II, even when ancillary benefits are taken into consideration. Second, our research demonstrates how the different results compare to the results of Finus and Rübbelke (2013) and Froyn and Hovi (2008), which consider a different situation. Finus and Rübbelke (2013) show that ancillary benefits have a negative or neutral impact on a stable coalition in a participation game model. Compared to Finus and Rübbelke (2013), our situation is different because we do not assume compliance. If the ancillary benefits are newly taken into consideration using our framework, the negative effect disappears. Froyn and Hovi (2008) show that a full participation agreement can be sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium under Penancem. Compared to Froyn and Hovi (2008), our situation is different because we introduce ancillary benefits. If the ancillary benefits are considered in our framework, the number of punishing countries can decrease because of the ancillary benefits while achieving a full participation agreement. Third, this study reveals that, although full participation is achieved for two types of payoff functions, the effect of ancillary benefits differs between the two cases. The number of punishing countries decreases with an increase in ancillary benefits in Case I and remains unchanged in Case II. In other words, the ancillary benefits affect the incentive for deviation and renegotiation in Case I, whereas the ancillary benefits have no impact on these incentives in Case II. The directions for future research are promising. First, we should explore the impact of international trade on full participation IEAs. For instance, Cai et al. (2013) reveal that international trade enhances the incentive for participation in agreements. Therefore, it is important to consider a cooperative coalition formation in the event that one country’s provision of public goods encourages abatement in another country. Second, we should study IEAs with domestic environmental policies and the concept of environmental R & D. Finally, we should also analyze the full participation agreement for heterogeneous countries.