6. Concluding remarks
The present study attempts to establish a linkage between EQ and managerial access to both external (bank) and internal (retained earnings and firm performance) debt financing Our primary conjecture lies in the fact that higher quality accounting information, in general, and higher quality earnings, in particular, reduce the risks of moral hazard and information asymmetry with respect to borrowers. More informative accounting accruals as the key component of earnings are regarded as the increased monitoring in the capital market and through private lenders. Our measure of EQ is based on accruals quality metrics developed by prior seminal works (e.g. Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2005). Moreover, we use six more constructs for EQ (derived from the time-series properties of earnings, selected qualitative characteristics in the FASB’s conceptual framework and the relations among income, cash and accruals) as alternative measures. Employing panel data analysis on a sample of 108 companies listed on the TSE, we find consistent evidence with our primary expectations and the prior literature on finance. Specifically, our results suggest a positive relationship between EQ (all metrics) and managerial access to bank debt financing and, by contrast, a negative relationship between EQ (all metrics) and managerial access to internal debt financing.
Our findings could provide new insights into the way creditors play the role of a monitoring leverage necessary to keep the quality of corporate financial reports at plausible levels. However, their monitoring role may not be effective in terms of internal financing, probably because corporate managers have more tendency to avoid costly debt covenant violations rather than report earnings of higher quality or earnings which are more informative about firm’s future cash flows. Furthermore, our study uses a sample of small -or medium-sized and financially constrained quoted firms operating in a developing capital market. Accordingly, the variations in the degree of access to external capital markets for relatively unconstrained firms could be considered as another factor in reporting higher quality earnings by the managers. More specifically, constrained firms (with relatively limited access to bank credit facilities) overcome their external financing constraints by accumulating more internal funds to finance higher growth.