- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
This study builds upon the argument of alignment effect and posits that the close alignment of the interests between Chinese central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) and those of the Chinese central government creates state-level incentives (e.g. GDP volatility mitigation) for CSOEs to manage earnings. Consistent with our proposition we find that Chinese CSOEs engage in earnings management to reduce GDP volatility. Furthermore, we find that Chinese CSOEs only use the real earnings management approaches that also reduce enterprise earnings volatility to mitigate GDP volatility.
This study empirically investigates the earnings management of Chinese CSOEs. We found that CSOEs engage in certain forms of real earnings management activities to help reduce GDP volatility in low (high) GDP growth years, which is consistent with the principles of the extended Alignment Effect that high level state ownership induces strong earnings management incentives at state level. Such earnings management activities help lessen the appearance of economic volatility, which can be conducive to state political and social stability. In addition, the earnings management methods chosen by Chinese CSOEs for state-level incentives also result in reduced enterprise earnings volatility. This study contributes to the SOE earnings management literature by extending the existing Alignment Effect argument and by contributing to our understanding of SOE earnings management incentives and opportunities. In doing so, we present a new perspective that other scholars can use to examine other non-traditional earnings management incentives that SOEs may be subjected to.