- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
1 - INTRODUCTION
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) highlight the enormous practical importance of GC. Despite the common-sense perception that investors are willing to pay more for firms with best CG practices, the doubt still persists over how the relationship between CG and performance is constructed in Latin America (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007). Minority shareholder protection varies widely around the world and different legal origin partly explains it (Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1998). All Latin American countries, however, share a common origin in civil law and their capital markets may offer a below-average minority shareholder protection relative to other civil law nations (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007). The voluntary adoption of better CG practices may partially compensate investors for this weak institutional environment (Garay and González, 2008).
5 – CONCLUSION
This meta-analysis examined the relationship between CG and performance in Latin America through the integration of empirical results from 42 studies – many published in Portuguese and Spanish. The sample is homogeneous for values of Cronbach's Alpha greater than 0.9 and the evidence suggests that CG practices are positive and significantly associated with firm performance.
For Cronbach's Alpha of 0.8, the sample is no longer homogeneous, and it is necessary to include "controls" for different CG mechanisms, or metrics. The meta-analysis results, in this ensuing investigation, indicate that the board of directors and ownership and control structure are negatively and significantly associated with firm performance. This result is not surprising given the high ownership concentration levels in the region and the likely power large shareholders exert on boards. However, the relationship between CG and performance becomes positive and significant when studies represent CG through broad scores of practices, the listing in special trading segments, or the issuance of ADRs. Garay and González (2008) hold that the low level of minority shareholder protection provides firms with an opportunity to differentiate by adopting a wide range of CG practices as a compensation mechanism for the weak institutional environment. Thus, control concentration and boards may not be effective means of shareholder wealth maximization in the region but other CG practices, such as better disclosure, may compensate for these negative effects. More studies are needed to understand the dynamics between board and ownership structure with other CG mechanisms, such as transparency and executive compensation.