دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی تاثیر کنترل سهامداران بر رابطه بین CSR و کیفیت کسب و کار - تیلور و فرانسیس 2018

Abstract

This paper examines how controlling shareholders may affect the relationship between the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and earnings quality. We find that controlling shareholders have a significant impact on the relationship between the level of CSR and earnings quality; the relationship between the level of CSR and earnings quality is significantly positive in privately owned enterprises but not state-owned enterprises; and, among state-owned enterprises, the relationship is weaker at enterprises controlled by the central government than at those controlled by local governments. Our paper highlights the differential impacts of controlling shareholders on the relationship between CSR and earnings quality.

6. Conclusions

This paper examines the relationship between the level of CSR and earnings quality and whether controlling shareholders affect the relationship. We find a positive relationship between the level of CSR and earnings quality in China. This relationship is significant at POEs but not significant at SOEs. In addition, among SOEs, the relationship is weaker at CGCEs than at LGCEs.

Overall, our results are consistent with the transparent financial reporting theory. They indicate that companies with a high level of CSR behave in a responsible manner to restrict earnings management, delivering more transparent and reliable financial information to investors. Our results are consistent with prior research (Carnegie and Napier, 2010; Kim et al., 2012; Laux and Leuz, 2009) and reinforce the uniqueness of CSR practices from the perspective of controlling shareholders in China. Unlike SOEs, the managers of POEs tend to report CSR practices voluntarily and deliver transparent financial statements and maintain a good reputation. Therefore, the relationship between the level of CSR and earnings quality is more significant at POEs. SASAC imposes mandatory CSR reporting requirements on CGCEs, its dual-task characteristics of CGCEs that weaken the relationship between the level of CSR and earnings quality, unlike at LGCEs.