دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی تغییرات در حاکمیت شرکتی و گردش اجرایی بالا: شواهد از ژاپن - الزویر 2017

Abstract

We examine the turnover of top executive in Japanese firms throughout the period 1990–2013. During this time, the presence of a main bank has been weakened, the ownership of institutional investors has rapidly increased, and independent outside directors have been introduced in many firms. We find that top executive turnover sensitivity to corporate performance has not changed despite skepticism on corporate governance of Japanese firms. On the other hand, there is a shift from return on assets (ROA) to return on equity (ROE) and stock returns as performance indicators that turnover is most sensitive to. We also examine possible sources of this change. We find that foreign institutional investors strengthen the turnover sensitivity to ROE after banking crisis when their shareholding has dramatically increased. This result allows us to interpret that they began to play a disciplinary role. In contrast, we do not find that independent outside directors have any significant effect of enhancing turnover sensitivity to ROE, unless a firm appointed independent outside directors more than three. While the scope of the main bank’s authority has substantially contracted, strong ties with main banks increase turnover sensitivity in the more recent period, indicating that main banks continue to perform a certain role in disciplining management.

8. Conclusion

In our analysis, we explored the relationship between top executive turnover and firm performance for 1990 to 2013. Entering the 1990s, top executive turnover at Japanese firms increased. Furthermore, Japanese top executive turnover was negatively sensitive to performance to a significant degree. Therefore, in spite of skepticism on the effectiveness of corporate governance in Japan, our results suggest that the relationship between a firm’s declining performance and top executive turnover has not been severed over the past 20 years. In fact, the biggest change that has occurred during this period is that the performance indicator that top executive turnover is sensitive to has shifted from ROA, a measure of performance preceding interest payments, to ROE and stock returns, which are directly related to shareholder interests. This result is consistent with the evolution of the corporate governance arrangement as seen in the dissolution of cross-shareholding, the increase in foreign institutional investor ownership, and board reform.