- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
The studies on capital tax competition have assumed that the governments compete for mobile capital in unit tax, and this assumption is partially justified by Lockwood (2004), which proves that unit tax competition is always welfare superior to ad valorem tax competition within a framework of symmetric tax competition. This paper presents the reexamination of governments' choice on tax method in the framework of asymmetric tax competition. The results show that asymmetric countries do not compete in the same tax instrument, as assumed in the literature. The capital importing countries compete in ad valorem tax, while the capital exporting countries compete in unit tax.
4. Concluding remarks
We attempt to reexamine the conventional assumption on the tax method employed in the tax competition model. It has been assumed that all governments compete in the unit tax even though they have different characteristics in technology and capital endowments. In contrast to the traditional argument, the main result of our study perhaps sheds a new light on the choice on tax instrument in tax competition analysis. In an asymmetric tax competition model, the best choice for capital importing countries could be to use the unit tax, but the best tax instrument for capital importing countries is the ad valorem tax. Our result can provide an alternative explanation as to why countries, in fact, employs the ad valorem tax method in a tax competition environment. If countries are net capital importers, it is the best strategy for them to employ ad valorem tax, so that ad valorem tax competition prevails.