دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی سودمندی مدیریت ریسک سازمانی در دو بانک - امرالد 2017

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the management control system, the bank’s control package, influences opinion about the usefulness of risk measurement (RM) in different control contexts before and after a financial crisis, to understand what influences the usefulness of enterprise risk management (ERM) manifested in RM. Design/methodology/approach – The study is based on semi-structured interviews in 2000-2010, with senior bank managers of two international banks (Bank A and Bank B) – both ranking among the top 100 in the world but differing structurally and culturally. Findings – The two banks took opposite trajectories. Bank A went from high to low expectations of usefulness; Bank B went from low to high expectations. The different attitudes toward RM exhibited by Bank A and Bank B are explained by differences in their control packages, manifested by technocratic control and socio-ideology. Originality/value – This study reveals that there are not merely different degrees of RM usage in the two banks but that they also show two diverting trajectories. Given this finding, the significance of the organization structure and its control packages (especially the alignment between these two factors) is analyzed to find a plausible explanation for the different experiences of senior managers toward the usefulness of RM. This study contributes to ERM research and to the contingency theory of management accounting.

8. Conclusions

The aim of the study was to investigate how the management control system – the control package (Otley, 1980, 2016) of a bank – influences opinion about the usefulness of RM in different control contexts before and after a financial crisis, to understand what influences the usefulness of ERM manifested in RM.

The difference accorded the roles of RM and ERM in the two organizations may impact their usefulness, especially in the uncertainty surrounding times of crisis. These results indicate that Bank A, with its ability to align the concept of RM more closely to the regulators’ intended design, was delayed in its reaction to the financial crisis. This, together with the managers’ attitudes toward RM after the crisis, suggests that the difficulties associated with RM and ERM were not a matter of poor implementation on the part of Bank A. In contrast, RM had difficulty in aligning its original design in Bank B; yet, it was used as a heuristic device and served to guide the less-than-optimal and clumsy solutions in a situation of uncertainty, where alertness to contextual change matters. These differences in the outcome of ERM, especially in crisis, may also create differences in the long-run use of ERM between Banks A and B and suggests that these differences are unlikely to diminish.