دانلود رایگان مقاله چگونگی تکامل هنجار تجارت در اسکاندیناوی

Abstract

As the saying goes, “it takes years to build up trust and only seconds to destroy it.” In this paper, we argue that this is indeed the case when explaining trust formation in Scandinavia. Hence, in an attempt to explain why the Scandinavian welfare states hold the highest social trust scores in the world today, we argue that one possible historical root of social trust may be the long-distance trade practices of the Viking age. To manage the risk of being cheated, trade between strangers in an oral world required a strong informal institution of trust-based trade norms out of necessity to deal with the risk of being cheated. In contrast to similar cases like the famous medieval Maghribi traders, who counted on writing (Greif, 1989), the punishment of cheaters could not be supported by written documents such as legal documents and letters, as the large majority of Vikings were non-literate. If a trader did not keep his word, social sanctioning by word of mouth was most likely the only method to discipline the cheater and prevent future free-rider behavior. The early rise of trust-based trade norms in Scandinavia is an overlooked factor in the region’s long-term socio-economic development and social trust accumulation. This result points to the importance of free trade today, especially in poor countries with low levels of economic development and high rates of non-literacy.

5. Conclusion

It remains quite unclear how the observed high level of social trust in the Scandinavian countries came into being. Focusing on the peculiar Scandinavian trait of long-distance trade in a path dependency approach, our research question was as follows: How did trade norms evolve in Scandinavia? First, we argued that a rational economic shift in strategy from plunder to long-distance trade occurred among Scandinavian Vikings. Thus, in approximately 880 AD, the ‘good old’ roving days came to an end and were gradually substituted by strong trade norms during the 10th and 11th centuries. This was mirrored in the shift from the predatory longship to the knarr cargo carrier, enhancing the peaceful strategy of long-distance trade. Next, we argued that these trade norms were connected to social trust out of necessity in an oral culture where not all traders knew each other in advance in open networks. For a non-literate culture, this meant that if a trader did not keep his word, he would be socially sanctioned by earning a bad reputation. It would then be harder for the ‘cheater’ to carry out future trade, and this effect would discipline behavior and prevent free-riding. Thus, the trade norm of keeping one’s promises can be efficiently maintained when socially sanctioned.