دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی نقش قالب های شناختی در تصمیمات آمیخته درباره ریسک و تلاش - الزویر 2018

ABSTRACT

Cognitive framing influences the subjective valuation of monetary payoffs and an individual’s willingness to exert effort and take risk. In this paper, we explore how cognitive frames created by incentive design and the outcome’s fairness influence decisions on risk and effort. While such decisions are often combined in practice, the theories that study risk-taking and motivation to exert effort remain discrete. We set up a multiperiod, 2 × 2 experiment in which we analyze the effects of a bonus versus a penalty contract and a fair versus an unfair outcome distribution. We use a modified Sternberg task to measure risk-effort decisions. We hypothesize that in the case of conflicting cues from the two frames, the cue that creates a perception of loss dominates the decision. We also hypothesize that over time, prior performance influences current decisions by creating a new cognitive frame. We find that if the pay is unfair, neither a bonus nor a penalty seems to matter. If it is fair, high risk-effort tasks are stimulated more by a penalty than a bonus contract. The effect of prior performance eventually outweighs the effect of both incentive manipulations. Our results help to advance the management accounting literature by integrating separate theories on risk-taking and effort exertion to better understand interactive cognitive frames in comprehensive decision-making.

5. Discussion and conclusion

We investigate the effects of two incentive features − a bonus versus a penalty and an outcome’s fairness − on the assumption that via cognitive framing, they influence risk and effort decisions. Our predictions are based on two influential theories: prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2003) and organizational justice theory (Adams, 1963; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). These theories share a common feature: a reference point against which people determine the utility of their outcome. Both theories have been extensively tested and convincingly confirmed, but only for a single behavioral outcome − either risk-taking or exerting effort. We tested their effects on behavior that is usually beyond the scope of each theory and in a multiperiod setting. We were interested in whether social comparisons matter for risk-taking and whether gain and loss domains matter in exerting effort. Our more specific research question addressed how these frames combine in joint decisions about risk and effort. Prior empirical evidence is inconsistent showing that a variety of incentive system characteristics may invoke the same cognitive frames (i.e., gain and loss domains). But more importantly, there is no evidence on the interactive or additive effects of various frames, and whether the cues are consistent or conflicting.