- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
This article investigates, from an agency perspective, whether private family firms, compared to private nonfamily firms, are more tax aggressive. Moreover, for private family firms, the effect of the extent of separation between ownership and management on tax aggressiveness is studied. Additionally, we verify whether effective board monitoring moderates this relationship. Using Finnish survey data, results show that private family firms are less tax aggressive than nonfamily firms. For the subsample of private family firms, firms with a lower CEO ownership share are more tax aggressive whereas the presence of an outside director in their board mitigates this direct effect.
Discussion and conclusion
Contributions Corporate tax aggressiveness is a very young but active research domain. Even though this topic has received some attention in the academic literature, these studies only focus on low tax alignment countries. However, tax aggressive behaviour is also important to study in a high tax alignment country such as Finland. Contrary to low tax alignment countries, tax aggressive behaviour becomes visible in the financial statements of firms in high tax aligned countries which makes it difficult for stakeholders to value the true economic performance of the firm. Therefore, studying the determinants of tax aggressiveness in the context of high tax alignment countries is even more important. With our contribution, we wantto advance the knowledge on the determinants oftax aggressiveness by using a principal-agent setting, more specifically in the context of private family firms.