Conclusion
This article presents empirical evidence about the existence of systems of secrecy. It refines the theorization of the closure/disclosure tension by articulating two forms of revelations (confidences and gossip) into a process that supports the transfer of information about sensitive issues (events impacting future performances) when it is much needed (before their consequences are officially recorded). This study contributes to the management control literature by disclosing how management accountants can play both the role of watchdog and of business partner. It also shows how the articulation of confidence and gossip allows management accountants to mitigate some of the limitations associated with the use of MCS by diffusing non-written information required for coordination while preserving its ‘secret’ quality so important for encouraging open communication. Lastly, this article builds on existing research on the virtues of secrecy (e.g. Dufresne and Offstein, 2008) and complements it by observing the effect of secrecy beyond a single professional community. Secrecy has been shown to structure cohesiveness between scientific colleagues (Nelson, 2016), consultants (Costas and Grey, 2016) or lawyers (Brivot and Gendron, 2011), but the present article shows that it can also mediate communication across occupations such as between management accountants, operational workers and executive managers. It thus confirms the importance of pursuing current research efforts into “invisible” managerial systems (Parker, 2016) which hardly leave any material traces of their activities while being central to the work of organizing large corporations.