دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی قرارداد های پایدار: رابطه قدرت و عمل - امرالد 2017

Abstract

Purpose – There is a view that strong preventative contracts are essential to control supplier opportunism and delivery during an outsourcing implementation. This paper tests the proposition that contractual environments, typical of outsourcing engagements, are essentially conflictual and that context and circumstance can act to overwhelm formal contractual and project control and lead to poor outcomes. Design/methodology/approach – The paper reports on a supply case study focused on the outsourced delivery of an application development in the defence sector. Data was gathered by a participant observation in situ for a period of three years. A grounded analysis from observations, diaries, semi-structured interviews, focus groups, documentary analysis, and emails was carried out with six case organisations within the extended supply chain. Findings – Collaboration between suppliers and buyers can be blocked by preventative fixed price contracts and as a result when requirements are incomplete or vague this adversely impacts success. Implications for practice Strong contractual control focused on compliance may actually impede the potential success of outsourcing contracts especially when collaborative approaches are needed to cope with variability in demand. Originality/value The research raises the important practical and conceptual notion that an outsourcing can be a conflictual inter-firm phenomenon, especially where multiple actors are involved and business uncertainty is present.

Conclusion - the roots of project failure

This outsourcing event failed to meet any time, process or cost objectives as the strong governance mismatched the changed business circumstances that demanded a more collaborative inter-dependent mode of operation (Sanderson, 2009, Sanderson and Cox, 2008). The consortium created to deliver the software consisted of six interacting partners, each with their own internal objective and supporting its own organisational and individual group objectives (Marshall et al., 2015, Morgan, 1997). These organisations were operating within the overall framework of an overarching goal as laid down in the contract. However, they also needed to achieve other objectives; such as cost reduction, service delivery and service profit margin. Changes in institutional context, relationships and hierarchies, objectives and outcome have been shown to engender conflict if the objectives of constituent organisations are compromised or contested (Campbell, 2010, Campbell, 2004, Lindegaard, 2013). Furthermore, a project environment displays systemic conflict throughout all its stages, a situation known to be associated with poor outcomes (Verma, 1998). Within this project high conflict emerged due to severe constraints in ability to deliver and a focus only on contractual demands that constrained supplier manoeuvrability to respond to change. This resulted in suppliers focusing only on instrumental goals and showing low flexibility in response to uncertainty.

The strong controls observed and the tight contracts focused on ‘safeguarding’ or ‘prevention’ increases the control over suppliers but reduces the opportunity for cooperation (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011, Poppo and Zhou, 2013). Furthermore, processes put in place to constrain and regulate supplier’s behaviour to reduce risk, minimise supplier opportunism and ensure success are founded on a purely rational perspective.