دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی رفتار مشتری استراتژیک با مشتریان ناامیدی گریز و دو سیاست تخفیف - نشریه الزویر

Abstract:

In this paper, we study the impact of strategic customers’ disappointment aversion and decreasing valuation on strategic customer behavior and the effectiveness of two alleviation policies: pricing commitment and most-favored-customer protection. Consider a two-period model in which a seller makes the decisions of order quantity and sale price at the beginning of the first period. Customers will pay full price if they buy the product in the first period and the discounted price if they buy the product in the second period but their valuation decrease. However, the customers might not get the product when they decide to buy the product in the second period. Customers who can’t get the product in the second period will feel disappointed. We show that strategic customers will decrease the order quantity, price and total profit. Furthermore, we study the effect of the price commitment policy to alleviate the strategic customer behavior, and identify the conditions under which the policy is effective. In addition, we compare the performance of the price commitment policy with that of the most-favored-customer protection policy and show that the latter is more beneficial to the seller. But both the two policies can’t eliminate fully the strategic customer behavior.

5. Conclusion

The strategic customer behavior is affected by complex psychological factors. Customers’ psychological satisfaction tends to affect their economic utility and therefore influences their purchasing decisions. Generally speaking, fashion-pursuing customers will feel disappointed if they can’t obtain the product their wanted after the clearance period and this kind of disappointment is generally averse for most customers. In this paper, we analyze the impacts of disappointment aversion level and customers’ valuation decreasing rate on the decisions of pricing and order quantity based on the newsvendor model. We show that the strategic customer behavior can cause adverse effect to the seller’s profit, and the smaller the customers’ disappointment aversion level is, or the more slowly the customers’ valuation decreases, the more the profit will lose caused by the strategic customer behavior. Furthermore, we investigate the effect of the price commitment policy, which used extensively in reality, on the alleviation of the strategic customer behavior. We show that the price commitment policy is not always effective and identify the conditions under which the policy is effective. Moreover, we compare the performance of the price commitment policy with that of the most-favored customer protection policy and show that the most-favored customer protection policy can bring more profit to the seller. Comparing with the classical newsboy problem, these two policies can’t eliminate fully the strategic customer behavior.

In this paper, we assume that all customers in the market are homogeneous and with disappointment aversion ( k > 0 ). Generalizing the results in this paper to the case with heterogeneous customers and/or elation pursuing customers is an interesting research topic. For example, under customer disappointment aversion, the most-favored-customer protection policy is more beneficial to sellers than the price commitment policy. For the case with elation pursuing ( k < 0 ), which is better? We need to study further. In addition, our study is based on the classical newsvendor model, which is a single period model. Extending the research to the setting with multi-period is also needed to study further.