دانلود رایگان مقاله اثر رقابت خواهر و برادر در موفقیت شرکت خانوادگی

Abstract

Strong interconnections between family and business which are innate to family firms can prove to be the source of conflict. Of all conflicts, those between family members and especially between siblings erode the family’s harmony and can risk the firm’s continuity. The passing of the family firm’s control from the founders to the next generation is a critical stage for the family firm and can be a catalyst for conflict. This article extends the use of game theory in family firm succession to explicitly include the noneconomic factors related to the family dimension, focusing on the emotional cost of conflict resulting from sibling competition. The results show that this cost is fundamental in terms of successor selection. The article shows that the collaborative family outcome, which results from family members cooperating and acting as a unit, is better in promoting firm intergenerational succession and ensuring that the founder’s preferred child is appointed successor.

5. Conclusion

It is the enmeshment of the family and the business which is so unique to the family firms and justifies the increased potential for conflict in these firms as they are permeable both to the family and the business. Research shows that conflict is pivotal in the family firm and hampers the firm’s performance and compromises family harmony and cohesion (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). Succession is a critical stage of change and uncertainty which can exasperate conflict in the family firm. Deciding on who will succeed is one of the most important challenges that the family firm faces. The way it is handled, how expectations are managed, and how the final choice is made can lead to conflict especially among competing siblings. The existent literature on conflict in family firms does not pay any special attention to the conflict which can be triggered by the successor race. This paper extends the analysis to better understand the impact that conflict between siblings has in terms of successor outcomes. The article builds on the use of game theory to study family firm succession and contributes by highlighting the importance of emotional factors in determining the successor. The results show that the successor outcome will depend on the founder’s preference and also emphasize the importance of the cost of conflict. The findings demonstrate that the emotional cost of conflict which results from sibling competition is essential in the selection of the successor. The higher the emotional cost that a child sustains for competing against his sibling, the lower the propensity of that child being appointed successor, even if he is indeed the founder’s preferred candidate. The article introduces the collaborative family outcome which identifies the successor outcome when the family members come together in order to maximize the family’s utility. Our results show that in that case, in contrast to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium results, there is a greater propensity of ensuring family firm intergeneration continuity, as well as an enhanced possibility of the founder’s preferred child being named successor. The collaborative family outcome analysis highlights the importance of founders, practitioners and consultants working to promote greater cooperation and more cohesiveness between family members, as this will help ensure family firm intergenerational succession.