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abstract

Sales of digital goods via traditional channels are affected by those on digital channels, and thus a competitive relationship often exists. In addition, due to the ease of piracy, digital goods may suffer from a fall in demand, which intensifies competition. This study considers a single supplier who sells digital goods, which may be pirated, to customers through two independent and different retail channels, such as traditional and digital ones, which may compete with each other in terms of service and price. To consider the effects of piracy on demand, a Stackelberg game is utilized to determine the optimal gain-sharing ratio and the equilibrium prices for all channel members with an aim to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain. It is found that an increase in piracy would force retailers to compete in a smaller market, and thus lead to a decrease in profits for each channel member. Therefore, a retailer who has a greater market share and is capable of managing a lower piracy rate would gain more profits by setting a higher price.

5. Conclusion

This study considers the coordination of revenue-sharing between the supplier and two retailers for digital goods. A Stackelberg game is utilized to obtain the optimal revenue-sharing ratio which is determined by the supplier and is used by all channel members. In considering the competition of service and price and the impact of piracy, the two retailers can obtain the equilibrium retail prices according to their own cost structures and their conjectures about the other's possible strategies. For all channel members, with the equilibrium retail prices and the mechanism of revenue sharing, the profit of the supply chain as a whole would be maximized, and thus a win-win situation is achieved. Moreover, for those industries with an extremely low marginal cost that are often afraid of experiencing price wars, the adoption of revenue-sharing coordination and equilibrium prices gives retailers incentives to determine reasonable retail prices, and thus prevent the double marginalization that can arise from individual channel members maximizing their own profits, so avoiding a price war. This may greatly benefit industries with extremely low marginal costs, such as those providing digital goods which are sold by many channels