دانلود رایگان مقاله پول مردم فقیر سیاست پرداخت با موبایل مکزیک و کنیا

ABSTRACT

The diffusion of mobile money (also mobile payments) has so far been uneven by country. While in Kenya upwards of 50 percent of the population uses mobile payments platforms, in Mexico the proportion is barely above 2 percent. Drawing on interviews and secondary sources, this paper finds that the actors and the politics surrounding diffusion are key to success. Specifically, regulatory capture sheds light on the extent to which a highly regulated financial sector may seek to protect itself from competition from the telecommunication sector via mobile payments regulation they advocate for and even help formulate. In Mexico, the bank-led regulatory model of mobile payments has limited the diffusion of the service to the unbanked population because of regulatory capture by the banking industry. In Kenya, by contrast, the Mobile Network Operator (MNO)-led model has resulted in much higher rates of diffusion and reflects the extent to which telecommunications firms have played a decisive role in designing the regulatory regime and the limiting the impact of financial industry capture in that country. The implications for policymaking and regulation are discussed.

6. Conclusion

Financial inclusion via mobile phones has become the missing link for development economists who see access to savings, payments and/or credit via this new technology as a way to offer these services to populations previously difficult to serve. This paper has reviewed the variables that drive the development of mobile payments in Kenya and Mexico and found they are ideal markets for mobile money services. Specifically, in Kenya and Mexico access to traditional financial services is relatively low, and mobile phone diffusion and latent demand for financial services is high. But, while the potential market for mobile payments is high, the rate of diffusion has been strikingly different across countries. In Kenya, over 50 percent of the population has a mobile payment account compared to a little over 2 percent in Mexico. The difference in the diffusion of mobile money services can be explained as a function of the type of regulatory model in place. An MNO-led model is more conducive to the diffusion of mobile payments than a bank-led model. These two models represent opposite regulatory extremes. In the MNO-led model, the service is run by the mobile phone service provider and operates largely independently of financial institutions, whereas in the bank-led model, the service is run primarily by financial institutions. What explains the decision to adopt an MNO-led model versus a bank-led model of mobile payments? This study finds that the type of regulatory regime is a function of the industry actors involved and their relationship to regulators. Specifically, the level of regulatory capture by banks explains the mobile payments model.