دانلود رایگان مقاله اثرات مدیریت در مقابل مالکیت در نگرانی وظایف اجتماعی شرکتی

ABSTRACT

Based on socioemotional wealth theory, we argue that family and founder firms differ from other firms with respect to corporate social responsibility concerns. We further argue that the ownership and management dimensions of founder firms have opposite effects. Using a dataset of large public firms in the US, we show that family and founder ownership is associated with fewer corporate social responsibility concerns (CSR concerns), whereas the presence of a family and founder CEO is associated with greater CSR concerns. We conclude that it is reasonable to distinguish between family and founder firms and their respective ownership and management dimensions when analyzing CSR in large firms.

Conclusions, limitations, and further research

Our results show that the ownership and management dimensions of founder and family firms have different effects on the extent of CSR concerns. Whereas founder and family ownership reduce the number of CSR concerns, the management dimension of family and founder firms goes in the opposite direction: the presence of family and founder CEOs in firms is associated with more CSR concerns. Future research could be targeted to analyze the persistence of these CSR differences using samples of smaller firms, privately owned firms or firms outside the US. The latter would be particularly interesting because contrary to our results, the extant research suggests that family firms have a negative effect on economic development and welfare in emerging countries (Fogel, 2006). More qualitative research is needed to better understand the motivations behind the CSR behavior of families and founders as owners or managers. In particular, the specific roles of family, longevity, growth orientation and organizational and entrepreneurial identity in determining CSR behavior should be further explored. Another avenue of further research concerns the effect of transgenerational control intentions with respect to the CSR behavior of founder firms. A founder who intends to transfer his or her firm to the family may stress the importance of CSR differently than a founder who wants to sell the firm to outsiders. Finally, although our fixed-effects specification controls for firm-specific unobserved factors, our findings cannot fully rule out the possibility of reverse or dual causality. For example, a ‘noblesse oblige’ view has been proposed. It is suggested that founder-owned firms have superior financial performance relative to other firms (Miller et al., 2007) and may thus face higher normative pressures for ethical behavior. Regarding dual causality, Wiklund (2006) argues that family firms have more of their wealth tied to firm reputation and therefore invest more to avoid CSR concerns so that they maintain a good reputation and safeguard their financial wealth.