دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی ساختار مالکیت، حاکمیت شرکتی و کارایی سرمایه گذاری شرکت های چین - امرالد 2017

Abstract

Purpose – This paper aims to examine whether and how ownership structure and corporate governance have bearings on the investment efficiency of Chinese listed firms. Design/methodology/approach – The authors measure the investment efficiency by following the work of Richardson (2006) and classify listed firms into two categories: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms. OLS regressions with both industry and year fixed effects are used to investigate the effect of ownership structure and governance mechanisms on the listed firms’ investment efficiency. Findings – The authors find that ownership concentration has a negative impact on investment efficiency, and this effect is more pronounced in SOEs than in private firms. In addition, adoption of incentive-based compensation helps improve investment efficiency. Compared with other types of institutional investors, mutual funds are more likely to exert a positive effect on the investment efficiency of investee companies. Originality/value – This paper examines the monitoring effect of governance mechanisms in China from a new perspective, which is the investment efficiency. Furthermore, previous studies provide minimal evidence indicating any effect of incentive-based compensation on firm performance in China. This study provides empirical evidence on this effect by using incentive-based compensation (whether CEOs have been granted stock options) as an explanatory variable in the regression models.

5. Conclusion

Investment efficiency has received increasingly high attention in corporate finance in recent years. This issue particularly concerns investors in China because the majority of listed firms in China are controlled by the government, such that managers are likely to pursue interests at the cost of outside shareholders (Huang et al., 2011), resulting in investment inefficiency. This study aims to investigate the effects of internal and external governance mechanisms on the investment efficiency of Chinese listed firms. To the authors’ knowledge, this topic has remained unexplored in the existing literature. Our empirical results indicate that investment efficiency is higher when ownership concentration is lower, especially for SOEs. In addition, nvestment efficiency is higher with the adoption of incentive-based compensation. Moreover, investment efficiency is higher when CEOs own shares. Furthermore, compared with other types of institutional investors, mutual funds have a positive impact on investment efficiency, and this is more pronounced in private firms than in SOEs. Finally, other internal governance mechanisms (i.e. independent directors, the size of the board of directors and whether the board chair holds the position of CEO) play no role in determining investment efficiency.

Implications are provided for researchers, practitioners and policy makers. For researchers, future studies on investment efficiency should concentrate on variables that we find capable of explaining investment efficiency, including ownership concentration, any event regarding corporate governance improvement, whether CEOs own shares and cash flow. For practitioners, to achieve higher investment efficiency, investors are advised to pay attention to variables used in this study prior to investing. More specifically, it is generally recommended that they invest in firms with CEOs holding shares. In addition, when investing in SOEs, they should choose SOEs with lower ownership concentration. As for policy makers, given that results strongly indicate that investment efficiency improves with the adoption of incentivebased compensation schemes, further corporate governance reform that helps align the interests of managers and outside shareholders is needed to promote investment efficiency.