دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی ساختار مالکیت و عملکرد بانک در 15 کشور اتحادیه اروپا - امرالد 2018

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of ownership structure on bank performance in EU-15 countries. Specifically, it examines to what extent shareholder type and the degree of shareholder concentration affect the banks’ profitability, risk and technical efficiency. Design/methodology/approach – This study uses a sample of 1,459 banks operating in EU-15 countries from 2011 to 2015. It constructs a set of continuous variables capturing the ownership nature, the concentration and their interactions, and estimates an instrumental variable random effect (IV-RE) model. In addition, a panel data stochastic frontier analysis is conducted to estimate the time-varying technical efficiency for profitability and costs. Findings – The empirical analysis shows that bank performance is affected by shareholder type. When regressed against the entrenchment behavior of the controlling owner hypothesis, banks with large-block shareholders are more profitable, less risky and more profit efficient. Further, ownership concentration reverts the negative effect related to the institutional, bank and industry ownership. Research limitations/implications – The results support the hypothesis that concentrated ownership helps to overcome agency problems. They also confirm that managerial involvement in banks’ capital enhances a bank’s profit and its volatility. Originality/value – To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to consider the ownership nature, the concentration and their interaction using continuous variables, which allows for more precise inferences. The results provide new evidence that bank profitability, cost efficiency and risk are affected by the type of direct shareholders.

5. Conclusion

This paper aims to provide an innovative contribution to the current literature on corporate governance by determining bank performance from different perspectives. First, with respect to earlier studies this paper’s approach is novel, as it considers both the ownership nature and concentration, as well as their interaction, using continuous variables. Specifically, we distinguish eight categories of shareholder, which should be characterized by specific return-risk profiles consequence of their institutional roles and incentives. We use the proportion of each shareholder type participation to investigate how a change in j CORPORATE GOVERNANCE j Downloaded by UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LIBRARIES At 21:53 10 February 2018 (PT) ownership structure is related to bank performance. In this way, our analysis allows more precise inference in the data, attenuating both the aggregation bias among heterogeneous owners and the possible distortion in adopting a binary variable. Second, the empirical model provides new evidence on the above-described ownership structure along the profile of time-varying technical efficiency measures, controlling for random bank effect (bank heterogeneity). Third, the study provides new evidence that is not univocally in line with the literature. The most striking result is that block shareholding can constitute an optimal governance mechanism, but its effect on bank performance is also sensitive to the type of shareholders. Consequently, the entrenchment view hypothesis is rejected. However, the literature uses different measures of concentration, mainly based on a qualitative concentration measure or at least a continuous concentration variable within each shareholder category. Instead, this study uses a variable that measures the direct shareholder concentration at the bank level.