دانلود رایگان مقاله اوپک در مقابل شیل آمریکا: تجزیه و تحلیل انتقال به یک استراتژی سهم بازار

Abstract

In November 2014, OPEC announced a new strategy geared towards improving its market share. Oil-market analysts interpreted this as an attempt to squeeze higher-cost producers, notably US shale oil, out of the market. Over the next year, crude oil prices crashed, with large repercussions for the global economy. We present a simple equilibrium model that explains the fundamental market factors that can rationalize such a “regime switch” by OPEC: (i) the growth of US shale oil production; (ii) the slowdown of global oil demand; (iii) reduced cohesiveness of the OPEC cartel; and (iv) production ramp-ups in other non-OPEC countries; while (v) reductions in US shale costs act against these factors. We show that these qualitative predictions are broadly consistent with oil market developments during 2014-15. The model is calibrated to oil market data; it predicts accommodation up to 2014 and a market-share strategy thereafter, and explains large oil-price swings as well as realistically high levels of OPEC output.

6 Conclusions

The debate about OPEC’s November 2014 switch to a “market-share” strategy has drawn considerable attention. Many oil-market analysts view the decision as a battle of “OPEC vs shale” aimed at squeezing higher-cost US players out of the market. We have contributed to this debate with an equilibrium model that helps understand how fundamental market developments can rationalize such a regime switch by OPEC as a profit-maximizing strategy. This can explain why OPEC supply may optimally rise in response to high-cost supply growth (such as US shale) or weaker global demand—and induce an oil price collapse. Our calibration of the model shows it was better for OPEC to accommodate expanding US shale production up to 2014 despite having the spare capacity to squeeze them out of the market. Stylized comparative statics show how changes to OPEC’s information set at the time could prompt the late-2014 switch to a market-share strategy. Calibration to forecasts of future market data shows how evolving developments can sustain a regime switch to a squeeze. Through the lens of the model, the market-share strategy can be the better of the two options—given US shale capacity, OPEC coordination prospects, weak global oil demand, and other market factors.